




A note on the t-value and t-related solution concepts
van den Brink, J.R.
Publication date:
1994
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van den Brink, J. R. (1994). A note on the t-value and t-related solution concepts. (Research memorandum /
Tilburg University, Department of Economics; Vol. FEW 652). Unknown Publisher.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
i~i iiuiii iiii uuiiiigi iimni~uiipii
I„

A NOTE ON THE T-VALUE AND T-RELATED
SOLUTION CONCEPTS
René van den Brink
FEW 652
~~. KB---,.,
G~ BlBLI~ OTi hiEEK
TlLBURG
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.H.M. Ruys
A Note on the T-Value and
T-Related Solution Concepts~`







`The author would like to thank Peter f3orm, Rob Gilles and Gert-Jan Otten Cor their useful
remarks.
tThe author is financially supported by the Netherlands Organization Cor Scientific Research
(NWO), grant 450-228-022
Abstract
"f he r-value is a solution concept for a special class of cooperalive yames with
transferable utilities (TU-games). Other solution concepts can be defined and
axiomatized in a similar way as the r-value. We discuss an example of such a
r-related solution concept which is defined for all TU-games.
1 Introduction
A situation in which a set of players N can obt,ain certain payoffs by cooperation c.an be
described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities (or simply a TU-game) being
a function v: 2N --~ 1[i such that v(t~) - 0. We denote the class of all `I'U-garnes on N by
~N. An ef~cient allocation for v E~N is a vector x E IRN such that ~;EN x; - v(N).
An effïcient solution concept for a subclass of games C C QN is a function f:Q -~ )RN
which assigns to every v E~ an efficient allocation f(v) E 1R.N.
In 'I'ijs (1981) an efficient solution concept for a special class of 'I'U-games is
introduced, namely the r-value. First the following two functions on ~N are defined.
'Phc maryinal contribution is the function M: ~N -~ 1RN given by
M;(v) - v(N) - v(N `{i}) for all i E N and v E~N.
The minimal riyht is the function m: CN -ti 1RN given by
m;(v) - max I v(E) -~ Mj(v) I for all i E N and v E QN.
E3i `
jEE`{i} 1
A game v E t~N is called quasi-óalanced if the following two conditions are satisfied
m(v) G M(v) and ~ m;(v) C v(N) C ~ M;(v).
iEN iEN
(1)
The class of all yuasi-balanced games on N is denoted by QN. If v E QN then the
allocations rn(v) and M(v), respectively, can be seen as lower and upper bounds for
the distribution of the payoffs over the players in N. The r-value is the function
r: QN ~ IRN which assïgns to every quasi-balanced game the unique efficient allocation
on the line segment between m(v) and M(v), i.e., for every v E QN it holds that
1
T(v) - m(v) f cr~,(M(v) - m(v)),
v(Nl-L~ Nm,(vJ
W11P.r(' (k„ - ~EN M'(v~- ,En' m'(v}
if rn(v) ~ M(v)
0 else.
For every v E~N, k E lR~ and c E 1fiN the game ( kv ~ c) is given by (kv -}- c)(E) -
kv(1;) f~;EF c; for all E C N. In 'I'ijs (1987) the following axiomatization of the
r-value is presented.
Theorem 1.1 (Tijs (1987)) 'T'lec efJicient sol~r~tion concepl f:Q~ -~ 11~N is eyual to
the r-value if and only if the following two conditions are salisfied:
(t) for every v E QN it holds that f(v) - m(v) f f(v - m(v)) (minimal right
property~;
(ii) for everyv E Qó :- {v E QN ~ m(v) - 0} the vector f(v) E 1RN is proporf,iottal
to liee vector 11~7(v) E IEfN. (restricted proportionality properly~.
2 A T-related solution concept for all TU-games
,A disadvantage of the T-value is that it does not exist for garnes that are not quasi-
balancc~d. 'I'his is bc~cause thcr~' a~rc ga.rnc's for which the marginal contribution and
minimal right, are inacíequate as upper and lower bounds for the distribution of payoffs.
But for such games other bounds can be appropriate. If we take two functions L: ~N ~
)[3.N and U: C~N ~ IRN such that for game v the conditions stated under (1) are satisfied
with m and M replaced by I, and U, respectively, then the values I,(v) and U(v)
can be seen as lower and upper bounds for t,he distribution of payoffs in game v.
Let CJN(G,U) C~N denote the class of garnes for which thc conditions under (1)
are satisfied in terms of L and U. Then we define t{(~,v}: ~tv(L U) -~ ll~,N as the
function which assigns to every v E ~N(L, U) the unique efficient allocat,ion on the line
segment between L(v) and U(v). (Thus r - t{n`'`~} ) Moreover, if L and U satisfy
the S-equivalence property' then t{~''~} can be axiomatized similarly as the r-value by
"1'he Cunction j: Cjy llt~ , satisfies the S-equivalence ptoperty on G C GN if for every v, w E~,
k E Q~} and c E ll~N such t.hat, w- kv -F c, it holds that j(w) - kf(v) t c.
.~
replacing m and M in 'f'heorem l.l by L and U, respectively. (The proof of this result
is similar to the proof of 'I'heorem 1.1 as given in 'I'ijs (1987)t.) We refer to solution
concepts that can be obtained in this way as T-related solution concepts.
Most r-related solution concepts are only defined for specific subclasses of games that
satisfy the conditions stated under (1). However, next we present a r-related solution
concept that is defined for all Ttl-games. As lower and upper bounds for the final
payoff of a player we take the minimal and rnaximal contribution of that player to any
coalition. Thus we define I,: ~t`' --~ ]}iN and U: ~N -~ Il3N by





The lowcr buund l, has been considcrcd in Kikuta (1980), and the upper bound U in
Milnor (1952). This pair of functions forms reasonable upper and lower bounds for any
game on N.
Theorem 2.1 Fnr every v E t~N it holds that
L(v) G U(v) and ~ I,i(v) G v(N) G~ U;(v).
iEN iEN
Piioor
Let v E G`~~ and Ict, ~r: N' ~ N bc a pertnutation on N. [~'urther, let P(i,rr) :- {j E
N ~~r(j) c rr(~i)}, being the collection of players that precede player i in permutation
rr. Then we define rn~(v) E ffIN by
m;(v) - v(P(i,rr) U{i}) - v(P(i, ~r)) for all i E N.
It is easy to verify that (i) L(v) C mn(v), (ii) U(v) ~ m; ( v), and (iii) ~iEN m~ (v) -
v(N).
tIn that proof only twice use is made of the specific formula's of m(v) and M(v). 'This is to show
that for every v E GN, m(v - m(v)) is the null vector, and to show that M satisfies the S-equivalence
property.
From this it follows that L(?~) c U(v) and ~;E,,~ L;(v) C v(N) G~;E~, U;(v).
~
Next we define the function f:~~~ -~ )RN which assigns to every game v E~N the
unique efficient vector on the line segment between L and U. Since U and L satisfy
the S-equivalence property the function f is a T-related solution concept, and thus can
be axiomatired as in "I'heorern l.l by replacing m and M by L and U, respectively.
Similarly as shown in "I'ijs (1981) for t,he r-value, it can be shown that f is
contirwous, and satisfies t,he auonimity and zero player propert,icsx. Resides these
properties it turns out t,hat the value that f assigns to a TU-garne is equal to the value
that it assigns to its dual game.
Theorem 2.2 Let v E ~N and let v' E CN be thr. dual garne of v, i.e.,
v'(E) - v(N) - v(N ~ E) for all E C N.
Then f(v) - f(v`).
PROOF
Let v E GN and let v' be the dual game of v. P'or every i E N it then holds that
L;(v') - m3n (v"(E) - v`(E ` {i})) - rr~n3n (v(N) - v(N `E) - v(N) f v(N ` (G ` {i})))
- rEnin (v((N ~ E) U {i}) - v(N ~ E)) - m~n (v(F) - v(F ~ {i})) - L,(v).
Similar]y we can prove that U(v`) - U(v), and thus f(v') - f(v).
0
To conclude this section we show that for convex games the function f coincides with
the 7-value.
tThe function f:G -~ IEtN satisfies the anonimity property on C~ C 4N if for every permutation
n: N-' N it holds that f;(v) - fxl;l(v)(av) for all i E N and v E~, where av:2~" y 1R, is given by:
rrv(E) - v(~f~Er n(i)) for all E C N.
The f function f:~j y 1RN satisfies the zero player property on G C~N if for every v E G and
every player i E N with v(E) - v(E `{i}) for all E C N, it holds that f;(v) - 0.
Proposition 2.3 Let v E~N Ge convex, i.e., v(F, U F) ~- v(E (1 F) 1 v(E) ~ v(F) for
all E, F C N. 'lhen f(v) - r(v).
PROOF
LetvE~Nbeconvex,andiENandF~E~i.
By convexity of v it holds that
v(F) f v(E ~ {i}) - v(E U(F ~{i})) -~ v(E n(F ~{i})) 1 v(E) f v(F ~{
I'hus v(E) - v(~' `{i}) ~ v(E) - v(Es `{i}) for all F~ E~ i.
I~'rom this it follows thaL
}).
(i) U;(v) - m~x (v(E) - v(E ~ {i})) - v(N) - v(N ~ {i}) - M;(v), and
(ii) I,;(v) - m~n (v(E) - v(F, ~ {i})) - v({i}).
[n Driessen and Tijs (1985) it is shown that for a convex game v it holds that m;(v) -
v({i})foralliEN.
Thus f(v) - r(v).
3 Other T-related solution concepts
We conclude t,his note by mentioning some exarnples of other r-related solution con-
cepts. In van den Brink (1989) a reasoning is given why for some games the rnarginal
contribution and minimal right can bc seen as lower and upper bounds, respectively (so
their roles are reversed compared to their roles in determining the r-value). Consider,
for example, the simple majority game v on N-{ 1, 2, 3} which assigns the value 1 to
all coalitions t,hat contain two or three players, and the value zero to all other coali-
tions. In this game the `grand coalition' N is a`winning' coalition. If an individual
player leaves the grand coalition then the remaining players still form a winning coali-
tion. Thus the marginal contribution of every player equals zero. The rninimal right
of every player then equals one. Thus the marginal contribution and minimal right,
5
respect,ively, can be seen as lower and upper bounds for the distribution of payoffs.
The function t{,ti~,m}: ~N(M, m) -~ 1RN that assigns to every v E GN(M, m) the unique
ef6cient vector on the line segment between M and m, is a r-related solution concept.
Other possible lower and upper bounds are the functions L: C~N -~ )RN and U: GN -~
IlZN given by
L;(v) - v({i}) for all i E N and v E CJN,
and
Ui(v) - v(N) -~ Lj(v) - v(N) -~ v({j}) for all i E N and v E C~N.
jEN`{i} jEN`{i}
The function t{~,u}; ~N(L, U) -~ lFi`v which assigns to every v E ~N(L, U) the unique
efficient vector on the line segment between L(v) and U(v), is equal to the CIS-value
as considered in Driessen and h'unaki (199}), i.e., t{i,u}(v) - v({i}) -~
~tN)-~ EN„t{j})
~N
for all i E N and v E ~N(L, U).
'I'he following theorem characterizes the class ~N(L,U). It also shows that for
many garnes, in particular for superadditive games, the functions t{[„u} and t{`y,m} are
related t,hrough duality.
Theorem 3.1 Let v E t~N. Then v E ~N(L, U) if and only if v(N) 1~iEN v({i}).
Moreover, if v(E) ~~;EEV({i}) for all E C N, then t{~,u}(v) - t{na,n,}(v'), where v'
is the dual game of v.
PROOF
Let v E GN. It is easy to verify that v E ~N(L, U) if and only if v(N) )~;EN v({i}).
Suppose t,hat v(E) ?~iEN7i({i}) for all F' C N. We show that the lower and upper
bounds of the CIS-value t{i,u}(v) coincide with the corresponding bounds of t{n-r,,,a}(v.)
For every i E N wc can derive that
M;(v') - v'(N) - v'(N ~ {i}) - v(N) - v(~) - (v(N) - v({i})) - v({i}) - L;(v)
an d
6
mi(7i') - r}i3x I v'(l~) - ~ Mj(v~) I - ri ~X ~v(N) - v(N `F ) - ~ v({~})
` jEF'~{i} J ` jEN~{i} ~
- v(N) - m~n w(N ~ L') ~- ~ v({j})~ - v(N) - r~irr w(1.') f ~ v({~})~
jEE`{i} ~ jEN`(Fu{i})
Since v(L) )~;E~ v({i}) for all E C N it holds that the minimum in the last expres-
sion is obtained for F- 0. Thus
m;(v') - v(N) - ~ v({j}) - Ui(v).
;EN`{i}
O
More r-related solution concepts can be found in the survey paper by Tijs and Otten
( ] 993).
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